Yeah it does to me. I think at this point you could jump in and say: WHY!? What makes the moral code, THE moral code?
Proximately? The language we speak. The moral code is "the moral code" in the same way that the Earth is "the Earth". Sure, you can always redefine words, declare that "morality" might mean paperclip maximization or that "the Earth" might mean a pancake. But at that point, you are no longer speaking the same language as your interlocutor - and at any rate, you have simply changed the thing you are talking about, not the properties of the thing your interlocutor is talking about. So you're not actually making any metaethical or metaphysical point; you're just playing with the fundamental arbitrariness of language.
Ultimately? We can ask why our language has identified this particular normative code with a special word, and why our culture and psychology give this code special significance. This is where we start talking about social evolution and fitness landscapes, which give us an objective and non-arbitrary* explanation for this behavior. Paperclip maximization - who cares? Certainly not natural selection. But morality actually does something.
*You may note that I both call language "arbitrary" and say there is a "non-arbitrary" explanation for how we use it. This may need a little unpacking. Using the particular word "morality" to refer to the thing morality is arbitrary; the language could use any word to refer to morality, and could use "morality" to refer to anything. But the historical explanation for why we have some word to refer to morality is not arbitrary in the least.
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That isn't what moral relativism is at all because it is in no way relative.
On the contrary, it is in every way relative. That's the point. If all moral codes are relative, no moral code is in anyway superior or more right than any other. Thus, all moral statements are null. If I believe torturing puppies and helping the Grinch steal Christmas are correct, and you don't, both statements are... I can't even say they're both correct, as in a moral relativist mindset, the statement "___ ethical stance is correct/incorrect" is a meaningless term.
It's merely saying its wrong or right because you think so
Yes, and look to the above for the logical conclusion of that.
Ethics does NOT say things are right or wrong because you think so. It's the study of how one should conduct oneself based on logic, reason, and facts with the aim of living a good life in order to gain happiness.
Moral relativism and ethics are thus incompatible. Moral relativism literally is only that, "you are right or wrong based on how you act in accordance to what you THINK is right or wrong". It does not go into reasons why one is right or reasons one is wrong, because it doesn't matter in moral relativism. If you think you are right, for whatever reason, you are right.
Do you see the problem now?
It's purely objective
Fail. Relativism cannot be objective, that doesn't make any sense, those words contradict each other. It would be like boiling ice water, it's either boiling water or ice water.
in that what the person thinks is moral is moral and shows no relativism towards the action.
This does not make sense.
It would be relativism if for example applied to a particular culture for example, which is a context.
No, that's cultural subjectivism. That takes ethical subjectivism (a person is right or wrong based on what he or she thinks is right or wrong) and applies that to a whole culture. It is PROFOUNDLY more problematic and filled with holes.
You act like a moral relativist would be an absolutist
That makes no sense. The terms are opposites.
and takes nothing into consideration in looking at the morality of an action.
Because they DON'T.
Again, look at the logical conclusion that results when you follow your line of thought.
The reason I dislike this is because this assumes that objective morality is possible.
No it doesn't.
It merely states that there is such a thing as facts, and that it matters WHY you believe something is correct, and WHAT your rationale is.
Once again, this is ethical subjectivism: "You are right or wrong for doing an action based on what you THINK is right or wrong behavior." Do you see the problem?
There's a huge difference between "there is no objective morality" and moral relativism. I need people to see the distinction before we proceed further.
You say this is wrong period because zombie shakespeare did not exist, but what if we cannot be sure?
If Zombie Shakespeare doesn't exist, then any action done on the basis that it is a correct action because Zombie Shakespeare said to do it fails, doesn't it?
On the one hand, from their point of view, the god does exist and the action is moral. However within our contemporary society, sacrificial rituals would be judged immoral by the majority. Since we're the majority, does that make them objectively immoral? Of course not.
I don't think you know what "objectively immoral" means. A majority does not determine objective immorality. If a moral code is objective, that means the morality is objective, as in it is what it is regardless of whether or not all people believe otherwise.
What if humanity is almost decimated, and for some reason the majority of the survivors are of this religion? Now the majority's stance is that sacrificial rituals are indeed moral. So now the morality behind sacrificial rituals is reversed? But, I thought it was objective...
Again, I'm not seeing a demonstration of understanding as to you knowing what "objectively immoral" means. If something is objectively immoral, then everyone in the world could believe that something to be a morally correct action and it wouldn't matter. That's the whole point.
Combine this with the fact that we have no 100% verified authority on morality and we are faced with the result:
Despite the fact that I do believe in a universal moral judge, the fact stands that even without one, ethics can still exist as a philosophy.
To say a moral value is objective just because the majority holds it is a pretty frightening idea, to me.
That is exactly the opposite of both what I have argued and what objective morality means.
I subscribe to this idea: At least, within a single culture. Except I don't like labeling it objective morality. Perhaps collective morality.
Collective morality is far more problematic than ethical subjectivism. I don't have the time to fully detail why right now. I feel I will have to later though.
Proximately? The language we speak. The moral code is "the moral code" in the same way that the Earth is "the Earth". Sure, you can always redefine words, declare that "morality" might mean paperclip maximization or that "the Earth" might mean a pancake. But at that point, you are no longer speaking the same language as your interlocutor - and at any rate, you have simply changed the thing you are talking about, not the properties of the thing your interlocutor is talking about. So you're not actually making any metaethical or metaphysical point; you're just playing with the fundamental arbitrariness of language.
I completely agree with the bolded part.
However when we apply this to the moral code, and we unpack it, we run into problems. This is why I earlier asked about what you meant by moral.
Ask a utilitarian what he means by moral and then ask someone who believes in divine command theory.
Ultimately? We can ask why our language has identified this particular normative code with a special word, and why our culture and psychology give this code special significance. This is where we start talking about social evolution and fitness landscapes, which give us an objective and non-arbitrary* explanation for this behavior. Paperclip maximization - who cares? Certainly not natural selection. But morality actually does something.
Yup, social evolution and fitness landscapes provide objective explanations of the behavior.
But paperclip maximization does something too! Just nothing that we care about. Hence the importance of values.
Imagine a bunch of paperclip maximizers get together, and say that line in reverse, "Increasing happiness - who cares? Paperclip maximization actually does something."
*You may note that I both call language "arbitrary" and say there is a "non-arbitrary" explanation for how we use it. This may need a little unpacking. Using the particular word "morality" to refer to the thing morality is arbitrary; the language could use any word to refer to morality, and could use "morality" to refer to anything. But the historical explanation for why we have some word to refer to morality is not arbitrary in the least.
I can agree with that. Yes there is an objective explanation for how it came to be that we call certain types of things morality. That is a claim I do not dispute.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
However when we apply this to the moral code, and we unpack it, we run into problems. This is why I earlier asked about what you meant by moral.
Ask a utilitarian what he means by moral and then ask someone who believes in divine command theory.
I'd point out that the differences between utilitarianism and DCT are mostly explanatory: they disagree about the nature of moral propositions, but by and large they agree on what the moral propositions are (don't lie, don't kill, etc.). We are still at a rather primitive state of understanding of the thing we call "morality", but even though we have many different theories, this doesn't mean we can't all be talking about the same thing nevertheless. Competing explanations for the same phenomenon are certainly nothing new in philosophy or science. But one of those explanations is true (albeit perhaps one that nobody has thought of yet), and the rest of them are false.
And yes, utilitarianism and DCT do disagree in some uncommon scenarios about what the moral propositions are. These disagreements stem of course from their underlying theories, not from a radical disagreement about what morality is. It's basic empiricism: observe an instance of a phenomenon, theorize about the phenomenon, apply the theory to a different instance of what might be the same phenomenon. All these moral theories are positing explanations for the morality they find in clear cases (again: don't lie, don't kill, etc.), and then using these explanations to try and decide what's moral in the unclear cases. They're still all on the same subject, and an explanation that's closer to the truth can help sort the matter out. A theory of paperclip maximization, in contrast, is on the subject of a different phenomenon entirely.
Yup, social evolution and fitness landscapes provide objective explanations of the behavior.
But paperclip maximization does something too! Just nothing that we care about. Hence the importance of values.
Imagine a bunch of paperclip maximizers get together, and say that line in reverse, "Increasing happiness - who cares? Paperclip maximization actually does something."
So what? There are no paperclip maximizers, and we have an explanation for why there are no paperclip maximizers.
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I'd point out that the differences between utilitarianism and DCT are mostly explanatory: they disagree about the nature of moral propositions, but by and large they agree on what the moral propositions are (don't lie, don't kill, etc.).
Right, but if the *nature* is wrong then it all falls apart. If a DCT later goes on to realize that God does not exist, then the entire reason for the moral claim X goes away under their view. It does not matter if some totally different theory still says X. It was the reason for X, not X itself was what mattered.
We are still at a rather primitive state of understanding of the thing we call "morality", but even though we have many different theories, this doesn't mean we can't all be talking about the same thing nevertheless. Competing explanations for the same phenomenon are certainly nothing new in philosophy or science. But one of those explanations is true (albeit perhaps one that nobody has thought of yet), and the rest of them are false.
Another option is that none of them are true. Additionally, morality could be a variety of hypothetical imperatives (This seems correct).
And yes, utilitarianism and DCT do disagree in some uncommon scenarios about what the moral propositions are. These disagreements stem of course from their underlying theories, not from a radical disagreement about what morality is. It's basic empiricism: observe an instance of a phenomenon, theorize about the phenomenon, apply the theory to a different instance of what might be the same phenomenon. All these moral theories are positing explanations for the morality they find in clear cases (again: don't lie, don't kill, etc.), and then using these explanations to try and decide what's moral in the unclear cases. They're still all on the same subject, and an explanation that's closer to the truth can help sort the matter out. A theory of paperclip maximization, in contrast, is on the subject of a different phenomenon entirely.
It could be that this is just a result of our moral faculties having evolved, so humans share similar values. This really does not tell us that there is some kind of ultimate right or wrong.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Right, but if the *nature* is wrong then it all falls apart. If a DCT later goes on to realize that God does not exist, then the entire reason for the moral claim X goes away under their view. It does not matter if some totally different theory still says X. It was the reason for X, not X itself was what mattered.
Bass-ackwards. Phenomena first, explanations second. If we find out that an explanation is wrong, the phenomenon doesn't go away. It's ridiculous to think that biologists, when confronted with evidence that there is no vital spirit to separate living from unliving matter, would have thrown up their hands and said, "I guess nothing is alive!"
Additionally, morality could be a variety of hypothetical imperatives (This seems correct).
It's one specific set of hypothetical imperatives, that's a little fuzzy due to human uncertainty, but is nevertheless identifiable clearly enough that we can have conversations about what exactly it is and where it came from. If everyone were just bringing their own random imperatives to the table, we would not see the huge overlap that we do.
It could be that this is just a result of our moral faculties having evolved, so humans share similar values. This really does not tell us that there is some kind of ultimate right or wrong.
What would you consider "ultimate right or wrong"? It strikes me that you may have an impossible standard. The cold, hard logic of life as an intelligent social animal has asserted itself through group selection to produce the moral norms we observe. Call it "ultimate" or don't, but it is objective morality.
It's one specific set of hypothetical imperatives, that's a little fuzzy due to human uncertainty, but is nevertheless identifiable clearly enough that we can have conversations about what exactly it is and where it came from. If everyone were just bringing their own random imperatives to the table, we would not see the huge overlap that we do.
And why couldn't this be caused by teaching and convergent thought? If you think our understanding of morality is a product of evolution, isn't it then comparable to convergent evolution? IE, two different bird species evolve in two different ecosystems wherein there are large amounts of grubs in trees and both consequently develop a tool to extract said grubs.
Could not humans arrive to similar moral judgments because... we're all human? In the same way that all sharks have gills because it helped them to breathe underwater, and they had that trait before they differentiated? Isn't it possible that the roots of this morality were established before humans began to spread around the world, thus creating the bottleneck effect on it?
I'd also like to point out that our morality is not and was especially not very uniform before globalization... western morality has commonly shunned suicide greatly, whereas it was embraced in several forms in Japan. We still have plenty of debates on this forum about how the middle-east is "barbaric" and such.
The cold, hard logic of life as an intelligent social animal has asserted itself through group selection to produce the moral norms we observe. Call it "ultimate" or don't, but it is objective morality.
Forgive me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that the fact (if it is indeed a fact) that our morality came about by evolution proves that it's the best form of it? Evolution does not bring to the surface the best traits, simply ones that are sufficient.
Is it "best" that we don't have several adaptations that other species do? What about back when all species had no CNS? Surely you wouldn't have said that no CNS is optimal if you knew that you could have a CNS...
@Highroller: I'm not misunderstanding the term "objective". I'm not understanding how you can say something is objective and assume that we know what it is. By what means have you deduced (not induced) this objective morality? The only source I can see from what you and many others say, is the majority. If it's from the majority, then how do you know that your colleagues were correct? How can you know that any source of morality is "correct"? How do you know that the German nazis weren't correct?
Bass-ackwards. Phenomena first, explanations second. If we find out that an explanation is wrong, the phenomenon doesn't go away. It's ridiculous to think that biologists, when confronted with evidence that there is no vital spirit to separate living from unliving matter, would have thrown up their hands and said, "I guess nothing is alive!"
I agree that phenomena -> explanations is the proper way to go about things. However, this is not how all people operate. I think the DCT example was quite fitting, because many fervent religious people adamantly deny that you can have morality without God. If God disappeared then for them moral claims would go away. Why? Because the *reason* would be gone.
It's one specific set of hypothetical imperatives, that's a little fuzzy due to human uncertainty, but is nevertheless identifiable clearly enough that we can have conversations about what exactly it is and where it came from. If everyone were just bringing their own random imperatives to the table, we would not see the huge overlap that we do.
If you agree with me on the hypothetical imperative nature of morality then I would go so far as to say we are almost entirely in agreement on this. I think our dispute is now purely on what we mean by "objective".
Yes moral claims typically refer to a certain class of hypothetical imperatives.
What would you consider "ultimate right or wrong"? It strikes me that you may have an impossible standard. The cold, hard logic of life as an intelligent social animal has asserted itself through group selection to produce the moral norms we observe. Call it "ultimate" or don't, but it is objective morality.
Kant had a system of morality that did not use hypothetical imperatives. That was one of his big goals for a moral theory, as he did not think hypothetical imperatives were enough.
Additionally apologists like William Lane Craig think that God provides an objective metric or right and wrong, in a way different from a hypothetical imperative.
Generally theories of morality like those are called objective. The kind of morality that you seem to be talking about is real, but not objective in the above sense.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Could not humans arrive to similar moral judgments because... we're all human? In the same way that all sharks have gills because it helped them to breathe underwater, and they had that trait before they differentiated? Isn't it possible that the roots of this morality were established before humans began to spread around the world, thus creating the bottleneck effect on it?
Sure. And to a certain extent, I think that's what actually happened; certainly hominids were social animals long before Homo sapiens. But I believe what you're getting at is that these "bottlenecks" can lead to the spread of arbitrary and non-adaptive traits - like how East Asians have epicanthic folds, despite there being no known survival advantage to them. So the question is, is moral behavior adaptive or non-adaptive? And I think the evidence is resoundingly in favor of it being adaptive.
But you're right, the best test of this theory would be to find another intelligent social animal that evolved independently of us and see if they converged on the same solution to the problem.
I'd also like to point out that our morality is not and was especially not very uniform before globalization... western morality has commonly shunned suicide greatly, whereas it was embraced in several forms in Japan. We still have plenty of debates on this forum about how the middle-east is "barbaric" and such.
Of course different societies are different in detail; if there weren't variation, there wouldn't be evolution. But only scratch the surface of these "barbaric" moral codes, and you'll see that they all run on the same operating system, as it were. Ritual suicide may not show up in all cultures, but the concepts of disgrace and atonement are certainly familiar to us, as is the reason for disgrace: duty, and the failure to fulfill it. The more I read about different cultures, the more struck I am by how fundamentally similar we all are, in spite of wildly different circumstances.
Forgive me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that the fact (if it is indeed a fact) that our morality came about by evolution proves that it's the best form of it? Evolution does not bring to the surface the best traits, simply ones that are sufficient.
Is it "best" that we don't have several adaptations that other species do? What about back when all species had no CNS? Surely you wouldn't have said that no CNS is optimal if you knew that you could have a CNS...
And this is precisely why I can comfortably reject Medieval Japanese cultural practices, or even modern Western ones, as the true morality. The fundamentals of human moral behavior are solid, I think, and Western liberalism is the closest we've yet come to the lofty apex of the fitness peak. But I certainly don't deny that there's room for improvement - perhaps a lot of room. What evolution does is point us in the right direction, give us a project we can identify objectively. It's not the be-all and end-all of the matter.
I agree that phenomena -> explanations is the proper way to go about things. However, this is not how all people operate. I think the DCT example was quite fitting, because many fervent religious people adamantly deny that you can have morality without God. If God disappeared then for them moral claims would go away. Why? Because the *reason* would be gone.
Well, humans are human, and sometimes they get way too attached to a theory. There are scientists who will swear up and down that their explanation for the phenomena is the only possible one, that if it were any other way the phenomena simply could not be. To a certain extent, this isn't a bad thing - after all, the scientific method does uncover the truth by eliminating impossible explanations. But we can still be wrong. The perceived reason can disappear and leave the actual reason intact.
Kant had a system of morality that did not use hypothetical imperatives. That was one of his big goals for a moral theory, as he did not think hypothetical imperatives were enough.
Additionally apologists like William Lane Craig think that God provides an objective metric or right and wrong, in a way different from a hypothetical imperative.
Generally theories of morality like those are called objective. The kind of morality that you seem to be talking about is real, but not objective in the above sense.
I'm not familiar with the work of Craig in particular, but if he's like most divine command theorists he shares one major feature with Kant: when confronted with the is-ought gap they don't try to bridge it, but rather establish a foundational truth on the "ought" side and build from there. And this seems to be what you're getting at in your quest for the "ultimate". But it strikes me as very strange to exclude moral naturalists like myself, who do try to ground morality on the "is" side of the gap, from the objectivist club.
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Well, humans are human, and sometimes they get way too attached to a theory. There are scientists who will swear up and down that their explanation for the phenomena is the only possible one, that if it were any other way the phenomena simply could not be. To a certain extent, this isn't a bad thing - after all, the scientific method does uncover the truth by eliminating impossible explanations. But we can still be wrong. The perceived reason can disappear and leave the actual reason intact.
Very true.
I'm not familiar with the work of Craig in particular, but if he's like most divine command theorists he shares one major feature with Kant: when confronted with the is-ought gap they don't try to bridge it, but rather establish a foundational truth on the "ought" side and build from there. And this seems to be what you're getting at in your quest for the "ultimate". But it strikes me as very strange to exclude moral naturalists like myself, who do try to ground morality on the "is" side of the gap, from the objectivist club.
That pretty much is exactly what Craig does. And this sense of objective is something theists (Craig in particular) use when they bring up the moral argument from God's existence.
Quote from moral argument »
1. If God does not exist then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
Now I have a whole slew of problems with the moral argument and the DCT of ethics. But nonetheless, Craig would readily assert that Naturalists are excluded from the objectivist club, and I have not seen a naturalistic ethics that is capable of getting to the ought side in that manner.
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
That's easy; simply assert that all the "is" statements invoke forms and standards in the memory, rather than describing objective elements of experience.
All "is" statements are actually "ought" statements.
"The tissue box is to have tissues in it."
Well, actually, this particular tissue box is empty. Tissues are not in it.
"The tissue box ought to have tissues in it."
That's better.
Same with any "is" statement. They're all "oughts," semantically.
But nonetheless, Craig would readily assert that Naturalists are excluded from the objectivist club, and I have not seen a naturalistic ethics that is capable of getting to the ought side in that manner.
I'm sorry, in what manner?
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Exactly. I then go on to explain one reason why I believe moral objectivity to be impossible.
No you didn't. You seem to be conflating moral objectivity with "what the majority believes". That's exactly the opposite of that.
I was pointing out a perceived flaw in Highroller's judgment; pointing out one reason I believe that it cannot be objective: because we have no way to determine which claim accurately highlights the objective moral value of an action.
Except, you're arguing exactly the opposite of what I'm arguing. So no, you're not pointing out a flaw in my judgment, because my judgment is precisely the opposite of what you're saying.
We need to backtrack a bit here. Just ditch the term "Objective morality" for now.
Three viewpoints:
1. There is an a single, universally correct moral code
2. There isn't a single, universally correct moral code
3. Ethical subjectivism
There is a distinction between idea 2 and idea 3.
In idea 2, saying that mass genocide is correct because the hippopotamus told me to do it does not follow, for two reasons: the hippo cannot talk, and even if he could, him telling you to commit mass genocide is by no means a valid reason for behaving in such a manner.
In idea 3, saying the above is perfectly valid, because ethical subjectivism argues that you are correct if you believe you are correct, or incorrect if you believe you are incorrect. That's all there is to it. It does not matter if your beliefs are either logical or rooted in fact at all.
I'm arguing against three. I need you to see the difference between three and two. You seem to think that arguing against three means arguing for one. This is not the same thing.
But it (as you said) is abstract, and it has shades of gray because our species (or genetics or whatever you chalk it down to) has not come to a consensus yet.
Except, consensus doesn't matter.
Again, it doesn't matter if people everyone agrees that exterminating the Jewish people is a correct and proper action, it still isn't.
And, which I don't think you realize, this follows under both idea 1 and idea 2, not just idea one.
The concept (of an objective moral) itself can occupy many of these shades, because the concept is an amalgamation of the morals which the total population holds (resultant of evolution or socialization or whatever).
No, this is the problem. Your argument seems to be:
A. Objective morality is a moral system based on what the majority believe
B. The majority could believe something totally different, and thus the system would change
C. Ergo, objective morality is not objective
Except statement A is incorrect. That's precisely the OPPOSITE of what moral objectivity is, and also what I'm arguing.
However an individual cannot hold a moral concept in shades of gray, because that wouldn't make sense.
What are you talking about, we do that all the time.
It wouldn't lead to a practical use; while globally, abortion (for example, not a tangential bombshell :)) can be thought of as "somewhat right and somewhat wrong", if a person were to decide whether or not to get an abortion based on that idea, it wouldn't work. They need to pick a distinct point on the scale.
I don't understand what on earth you're saying here. People hold contradictory opinions in their heads all the time. People are ambivalent on things all the time. People are conflicted about things all the time.
Doing so means to separate from the "objective" morality, because it exists across the shades of gray, not in a single spot.
Again, what you're calling "objective morality" isn't.
Because of this, all individuals (or groups as a whole, such as societies and cultures) who need to exercise morality will come to a point where they separate from the objective morality for practical purposes.
I think by "objective morality" you mean societal norm? I mean, that's an extremely problematic idea in itself, but before we go into that I first want you to establish that this has nothing to do with what objective morality is.
If this is indeed what you mean by objective morality, then I agree.
It's not.
But I still say it should be called collective morality; I mean, hey, it wasn't clear enough for me, right?
Then we'll call it collective morality, but that's because that's not at all what objective morality means.
I would agree with you that his actions were wrong.
Good.
His actions would be going against my values.
Yeah but here's the thing. Your values aren't your values for no reason. No one rolled a D6 to determine whether or not you think abortion should be legal or illegal. Your values are your values because of an argument you have towards it.
You have values because you believe things are right or wrong, should be legal or illegal BECAUSE of certain arguments. You can make rational cases for or against certain moral statements.
So saying, "I would find his actions wrong because his actions would be going against my values" is correct, but understand, your values are not arbitrary. Your values are your values because you make a logical case for them.
I can further condemn and punish this kind of behavior. However, I do not see how I can do much more then that.
What do you mean?
The other argument often attributed to Mackie, often called the Argument from Disagreement, maintains that any moral claim (e.g. "Killing babies is wrong") entails a correspondent "reasons claim" ("one has reason not to kill babies"). Put another way, if "killing babies is wrong" is true then everybody has a reason to not kill babies.
Ok.
This includes the psychopath who takes great pleasure from killing babies, and is utterly miserable when he does not have their blood on his hands. But, surely, (if we assume that he will suffer no reprisals) this psychopath has every reason to kill babies, and no reason not to do so. All moral claims are thus false.
Well that's obviously bull☺☺☺☺ on many, many levels.
The statement seeks to argue that:
1. Any moral claim (people should not murder babies) is based upon reasoning for why someone OUGHT to act a certain way
2. There are people who do not act according to that moral claim (people who murder babies)
3. These people (murders of babies) must have completely sound moral arguments for why they act the way they do.
4. Therefore, any moral claim (murdering babies is wrong) will fail.
I mean Sneaky, you've got to be able to see the reason why this is crap for yourself without my having to explain it. Obviously the problem is in claim 3. Just because someone does act a certain way doesn't mean they ought to be.
I'm not sure whether this constitutes an "Is Implies Ought" fallacy or just gullibility, as in: "This man is taking my money, but I'm sure he has a great reason for robbing me blind."
Exactly. I have no qualms saying that if you value minimizing suffering you should or should not do X. However, that is not what most people consider morality.
I'm not sure what you're getting at here.
The entire point of ethics is to maximize happiness by living what is a good life. That's the point of living a good life: to be happy.
And I have trouble seeing how this would be considered objective. As an agent without that value has no reasons for following the moral claim.
Just because someone doesn't behave in a certain does not mean that he would not have any reason to do so.
Most people want to say that if X is wrong, then nobody should do X.
I don't see the problem. The fact that people do X does not cause the above statement to falter.
Unless you believe that every human being behaves like an omniscient supercomputer, in which case, good luck with that.
Oh I should have clarified. That seems problematic for *objective* moral statements. AKA the kind that would have person-independent normative power.
Blinking Spirit is right. I'm not sure why you see the two situations as different.
Here's a scenario: we have the world's most irrefutable logical argument for the statement: "People should never harm unicorns", and someone harms a unicorn.
You seem to think that the fact that someone harms a unicorn reflects in anyway upon the validity of the first statement, "People should not harm unicorns". Except, it doesn't at all.
Recognize that "people should not harm unicorns" is not the same kind of statement as "the train should be coming soon".
The latter is another way of saying, "I expect the train will arrive soon". If the train doesn't arrive soon, then obviously I was incorrect.
But the former is saying, "People should not harm unicorns if they wish to behave in a manner that is morally sound". The fact that there are people who engage in immoral ALL THE TIME does not in any way damage this statement.
Do you have a reason to invest if you place 0 value on money? I would say no. It seems more accurate to me to say that I can only point out reasons for action X to people if they value some result or consequence of X.
To keep up with the money example:
Instead of saying that the person with 0 value in money has reasons to invest but chooses to ignore them, I believe that it is more accurate to say that they posses no reasons to invest. This seems to fit our usage of the word much better.
I feel like we need to flesh out a definition of reasons at this point.
You seem unwilling to acknowledge that people can behave either illogically, irrationally, or stupidly. It will benefit you greatly to acknowledge this.
This entire dialogue seems to be your insistence that anyone who acts in any way MUST have unassailable reasons why he does so, that if a human being performs an action that action MUST be correct because a human being is performing it, and all human beings act in completely logical and rational and correct ways always at all times.
Or:
A. Every human being is incapable of immoral action
B. Human beings perform actions that contradict one another
C. All moral statements fail
Do you understand how none of that makes sense?
It's not just wrong, it's naive to the point where I have to believe you are smart enough not to believe this by virtue of you still being alive, and therefore must conclude you're not actually following your argument through to its obvious conclusions.
And that is where I think your claim would fail. When you make your claim, you are providing no reasons for person X to actually perform claim A. You are basically not showing any justification whatsoever for the *ought*.
The happiness derived from behaving in a morally sound and justifiable manner.
Or, "A job well done is its own reward".
For example, suppose you ran into a paper-clip maximizer. This creatures sole goal in life is to maximize the amount of paper-clips in the universe. He values paper-clip maximization solely, and above all else.
He says, Person X should perform action A where A maximizes paper-clips.
The both of you are going to proceed to talk past each other about what the other ought to do. Because neither of you has ANY good reason to follow the other's supposed normative claims.
Neither of your assertions are intrinsically motivating. They only hold any power for agents that share a similar value set.
I just want to point something out here.
Your two big examples so far have been:
1. The behavior of a psychopath.
2. The behavior of a hypothetical creature who cannot do anything other than desire the expansion of paper clips.
Both these examples are people who are unable to think in a logical and sane manner or are capable of rational decision-making.
Sure, all I am arguing against is an objective morality. Humans share many common values, and you can make normative statements along these shared values. For instance if you want to reduce human suffering, than you should do X.
That's not an argument against objective morality. The second and third sentences in fact have nothing to do with the first.
@BS: I agree, nothing is intrinsically motivating, which is why objective morality doesn't work.
I find Blinking Spirit's wording to be problematic here, which is why I want to amend it to this: even if something is stated to have universal value or worth, there's nothing that says that people will recognize this.
Exactly. To beg the question is for an argument to assume its conclusion in its premises.
You: If moral propositions don't motivate people to believe them, then they aren't objective. Me: I reject that premise. Here's an example of another statement that is objective and yet doesn't motivate people to believe it. You: But that statement isn't a moral statement. It's the kind of statement that doesn't have to motivate people in order to be objective; moral statements still do. Me: That's begging the question. I'm in the process of rejecting that premise; you can't defend it by reasserting it. You: Well, see my argument that morality isn't objective. Me: The premise I'm rejecting is from your argument. So that's begging the question too.
Again, I feel the wording is problematic, but I get what you're talking about. I would reword it as:
You: If moral propositions don't persuade people to believe them, then they aren't objective. Me: I reject that premise. Here's an example of another statement that is objectively true and what people believe has no effect on how true it is.
Yeah but here's the thing. Your values aren't your values for no reason. No one rolled a D6 to determine whether or not you think abortion should be legal or illegal. Your values are your values because of an argument you have towards it.
This is pretty much just wrong. My values are a result of evolution and my own social upbringing. No one argued me into thinking pain is bad and happiness is good. Any argument influencing my behavior will generally already assume I value some things. We already went over this.
Example: An argument to invest money assumes that I value money.
You have values because you believe things are right or wrong, should be legal or illegal BECAUSE of certain arguments. You can make rational cases for or against certain moral statements.
Rationality does not give you values. Rationality can tell you how to best actualize your values.
So saying, "I would find his actions wrong because his actions would be going against my values" is correct, but understand, your values are not arbitrary. Your values are your values because you make a logical case for them.
My values have no logical basis. I like pleasure, and happiness, and I value other creatures experiencing these same feelings. This is not a result of logic. I did not sit down one day and go: hmm I wonder what I should value.
Well that's obviously bull☺☺☺☺ on many, many levels.
I would be wary of dismissing a well known philosophers argument as obvious bull☺☺☺☺. They are held to slightly higher standards then forum posts.
The statement seeks to argue that:
1. Any moral claim (people should not murder babies) is based upon reasoning for why someone OUGHT to act a certain way
2. There are people who do not act according to that moral claim (people who murder babies)
3. These people (murders of babies) must have completely sound moral arguments for why they act the way they do.
4. Therefore, any moral claim (murdering babies is wrong) will fail.
I mean Sneaky, you've got to be able to see the reason why this is crap for yourself without my having to explain it. Obviously the problem is in claim 3. Just because someone does act a certain way doesn't mean they ought to be.
I claim no such thing, neither does Mackie.
I'm not sure whether this constitutes an "Is Implies Ought" fallacy or just gullibility, as in: "This man is taking my money, but I'm sure he has a great reason for robbing me blind."
You are not understanding the error theory argument. Check out the link.
The entire point of ethics is to maximize happiness by living what is a good life. That's the point of living a good life: to be happy.
This is a really confused statement. You can define ethics that way if you wish, but that is begging the question. Taboo good life. now what do you mean? If a good life is just being happy, then isn't that something entirely different?
Just because someone doesn't behave in a certain does not mean that he would not have any reason to do so.
If you told a Buddhist ascetic that he has good reasons to invest in the stock market, he would rightfully dispute that.
Unless you believe that every human being behaves like an omniscient supercomputer, in which case, good luck with that.
This has nothing to do with what I think.
Here's a scenario: we have the world's most irrefutable logical argument for the statement: "People should never harm unicorns", and someone harms a unicorn.
You seem to think that the fact that someone harms a unicorn reflects in anyway upon the validity of the first statement, "People should not harm unicorns". Except, it doesn't at all.
You could have a categorical imperative or a hypothetical imperative. You seem to be using language that would be categorical.
Recognize that "people should not harm unicorns" is not the same kind of statement as "the train should be coming soon".
Yeah it is normative. I dispute that it is anything above a hypothetical imperative.
You seem unwilling to acknowledge that people can behave either illogically, irrationally, or stupidly. It will benefit you greatly to acknowledge this.
This entire dialogue seems to be your insistence that anyone who acts in any way MUST have unassailable reasons why he does so, that if a human being performs an action that action MUST be correct because a human being is performing it, and all human beings act in completely logical and rational and correct ways always at all times.
At the risk of repeating myself: you have gravely misunderstood the nature of the discussion. By now, hopefully you will see what I have actually been talking about.
@ BLINKING SPIRIT
Moral statements that are universally binding is I believe what Craig wants.
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EDH Decks -- Updated 9/28
----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
(often more perspicaciously referred to as “the Argument from Disagreement”) begins with an empirical observation: that there is an enormous amount of variation in moral views, and that moral disagreements are often characterized by an unusual degree of intractability. Mackie argues that the best explanation of these phenomena is that moral judgments “reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life” (1977: 36). This, at least, is a better explanation than the hypothesis that there is a realm of objective moral facts to which some cultures have inferior epistemic access than others. The example Mackie uses is of two cultures' divergent moral views regarding monogamy. Is it really plausible, he asks, that one culture enjoys access to the moral facts regarding marital arrangements whereas the other lacks that access? Isn't it much more likely that monogamy happened to develop in one culture but not in the other (for whatever cultural or anthropological reasons), and that the respective moral views emerged as a result?
Except simply dismissing them as being things of different cultures doesn't work. By that logic, everyone would just work in lock-step with the ethical stances by which they were raised. Except, no, people go against those stances ALL THE TIME. And they go against them FOR REASONS.
If we had a discussion right now, someone in favor of polygamy, someone not, they would have to justify their arguments with reasons. This kind of ethical discussion isn't possible under cultural relativism.
Mackie says that for moral properties to exist would require the existence of “objective prescriptions,” and it is evidently these prescriptions that he finds metaphysically queer. He claims that in denying the existence of such prescriptions he is denying that any “categorically imperative element is objectively valid” (1977: 29). A categorical imperative is an imperative (“Do f”) that is applied to a subject irrespective of that person's ends. It is to be contrasted with a hypothetical imperative, which does depend on a person's ends. Thus “Go to bed now” is usually understood to be tacitly conditional, depending on something like “…if you want to get a decent night's sleep.” If it turns out that the person lacks this desire (or any other desire that promises to be satisfied by following the advice), then the imperative should be withdrawn. By contrast, the categorical imperative “Don't murder children” cannot be begged off by the addressee explaining that he really enjoys murdering children, that he lacks any desires that will be satisfied if the imperative is obeyed; it is not a piece of advice at all. Note that it does not appear to be categorical imperatives per se that trouble Mackie, but categorical imperatives that purport to be “objectively valid.” Quite what he means by this restriction, however, remains unclear.
Except no, the imperative should not be withdrawn.
I mean, are you actually trying to argue: "Don't put your hands on the hot stove if you don't want to get burned" should be withdrawn if that person actually wants to get burned? No, it shouldn't be withdrawn, because that person is desiring something that is harmful and incredibly counterproductive to their well-being.
This is what I mean when I say you don't seem to understand the idea that people can be irrational, illogical, or stupid.
It would make sense if Mackie were, then, simply to deny the existence of such “desire-transcendent” reasons (in the vein of Williams 1981); but his position is characteristically more nuanced than this. He allows that we often legitimately employ talk of reasons regarding persons who have no desires that will be satisfied by performing the action in question. If some other people are suffering, for example, and there is some course of action I can take to relieve that suffering, then “it would be natural,” Mackie says, to claim that these sufferings “constitute some reason … independent of any desire that I now have to help these other people” (1977: 78-9). Though Mackie doesn't attempt to discredit appeals to such desire-transcendent reasons, what he does insist on is that such reasons talk is made legitimate only by the presence of an institution: What allows the transition from “There is a stranger writhing in agony before me” to “I have a reason to help” is a cluster of institutional facts, not brute facts. Examples of institutions, given by Mackie, include the rules of chess, social practices such as promising, and the thoughts and behaviors associated with the idea of a person's identity persisting through time. Such institutions have rules of conduct which guide the behavior and speech of adherents, and transgressions of which are condemned. Importantly, such requirements “are constituted by human thought, behaviour, feelings, and attitudes” (1977: 81), and thus any such requirements are, in a central sense, mind-dependent. This, perhaps, provides insight into why Mackie objects not to categorical imperatives per se, but to objective categorical imperatives: It is categorical imperatives that profess to transcend all institutions, that purport to depend for their legitimacy on “requirements which simply are there, in the nature of things” (1977: 59), that are singled out as erroneous. As with categorical imperatives, so with reasons: It may not be false to claim “Anyone has a reason to ease the suffering of others,” but its truth is guaranteed only by invoking an institutional way of speaking—an institution of which one may or may not be an adherent. (Mackie writes that one is never “logically committed” to offer allegiance to an institution.) It is only when such a reason claim purports to transcend all institutions—when it is imbued with ambitions of objectivity—that it oversteps the mark.
I fail to see how the institution is relevant.
You're not selling this well.
This is a really confused statement. You can define ethics that way
That is the point of ethics. Why else do you think we've been arguing as a species for this long about how to live our lives?
Taboo good life.
This isn't a properly constructed sentence.
now what do you mean? If a good life is just being happy, then isn't that something entirely different?
No, it is by living a good life that we become happy.
If you told a Buddhist ascetic that he has good reasons to invest in the stock market, he would rightfully dispute that.
What is with you and the stock market? That's Blinking Spirit's analogy, not mine.
You could have a categorical imperative or a hypothetical imperative. You seem to be using language that would be categorical.
1. There is an a single, universally correct moral code
2. There isn't a single, universally correct moral code
3. Ethical subjectivism
There is a distinction between idea 2 and idea 3.
Ah... I see. I was right earlier; we were misunderstanding each other. I am a proponent of 2, and I thought you were arguing not against 3, but for 1; which I personally think doesn't make sense.
I took the topic to be "meta-ethical relativism" and you took it to be #3.
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"Virtue, Jacques, is an excellent thing. Both good people and wicked people speak highly of it..."
I am still talking about values. I think anyway, it is hard to tell when my line it taken out of it's context.
Sounds like a personal problem.
"I like" is completely different from a moral statement. "I like chocolate ice cream" is not an ethic. "Someone should do ___" is an ethic.
I agree here, why did you think I did not?
Why?
I already said how I got my values. The same way most humans do.
Answer the above question, we'll go from there.
.....
Is there a particular reason I should care who he is?
I am merely suggesting that rejecting out of hand may not be appropriate.
Except simply dismissing them as being things of different cultures doesn't work. By that logic, everyone would just work in lock-step with the ethical stances by which they were raised. Except, no, people go against those stances ALL THE TIME. And they go against them FOR REASONS.
Social norms are not rigid laws, but they do have strong predictive power on what people believe. Often, ethical disputes arise from differing values.
This particular argument is one of plausibility, anyway.
If we had a discussion right now, someone in favor of polygamy, someone not, they would have to justify their arguments with reasons. This kind of ethical discussion isn't possible under cultural relativism.
If you think that moral error theory is cultural relativism then you do not understand error theory. Error theory is a type of moral nihilism not relativism.
Except no, the imperative should not be withdrawn.
I mean, are you actually trying to argue: "Don't put your hands on the hot stove if you don't want to get burned" should be withdrawn if that person actually wants to get burned? No, it shouldn't be withdrawn, because that person is desiring something that is harmful and incredibly counterproductive to their well-being.
Yes that is exactly what I am arguing! If a person really-truly desired to experience pain, like if he was a masochist, then by all means he should try and experience pain. If that is what makes him happy, then go for it.
This is what I mean when I say you don't seem to understand the idea that people can be irrational, illogical, or stupid.
If an agent desires to feel pain then the rational move for them is to do actions that will result in them being in pain.
Intelligence has nothing to do with your values. You can be intelligent and have strange values, or dumb as a rock and have typical values. Stupidity would come into play with actualizing your values.
I fail to see how the institution is relevant.
You're not selling this well.
I am sorry I am not selling this well....
That is the point of ethics. Why else do you think we've been arguing as a species for this long about how to live our lives?
Because people think some kind of objective morality exists.
This isn't a properly constructed sentence.
I thought it was clear, apologies. When I say taboo X, I mean define X. What do you actually mean when you say X.
No, it is by living a good life that we become happy.
So now I ask, taboo "good life". You are making a claim that X makes us happy. That is an empirical claim. Now it could be that X is the path to happiness for most humans. This would not say much for people that X does not make happy. And it certainly would not be a path to objective morality.
What is with you and the stock market? That's Blinking Spirit's analogy, not mine.
It is a good example of a normative statement, and why normative statements depend on conditionals. What is wrong with the stock market?
How is this relevant?
Because you talk as if moral claims are categorical and then bring up hypothetical imperative examples.
@BS
What is it for an imperative to be "binding"?
If you do not think that morality is binding, and that all moral statements are hypothetical imperatives then I have no dispute with that.
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EDH Decks -- Updated 9/28
----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Once you acknowledge the fact that people go can go against whatever they may be conditioned by society to believe is right or wrong, you have conceded that there are more factors to be considered than simply "evolution and society".
If you think that moral error theory is cultural relativism then you do not understand error theory. Error theory is a type of moral nihilism not relativism.
I don't see how it is nihilism, but that's irrelevant. Your argument has many of the same flaws that cultural relativism does.
Yes that is exactly what I am arguing!
Sadly, yes.
If a person really-truly desired to experience pain, like if he was a masochist, then by all means he should try and experience pain. If that is what makes him happy, then go for it.
Then there's something ☺☺☺☺ing wrong with the person's belief system, isn't there?
If an agent desires to feel pain then the rational move
Not if they're irrational. That is the definition of the word, after all.
Intelligence has nothing to do with your values. You can be intelligent and have strange values, or dumb as a rock and have typical values. Stupidity would come into play with actualizing your values.
Again, you're doing the same thing the moral relativists do, "It doesn't matter where you get your ethical beliefs, or if they even remotely make sense, it just matters what you believe."
Except, that undermines the whole idea of logic and really any thought process at all, and makes us no longer philosophers and turns us into cavemen.
I thought it was clear, apologies. When I say taboo X, I mean define X. What do you actually mean when you say X.
Except that's not what the word "taboo" means at all. In fact it's pretty much the opposite of what taboo means.
Plus, there's a perfectly good word for what you're asking, which actually means what you're talking about. It's the word "define".
So now I ask, taboo "good life". You are making a claim that X makes us happy. That is an empirical claim. Now it could be that X is the path to happiness for most humans. This would not say much for people that X does not make happy.
... Are you intentionally this ridiculous, or have you simply latched on to this person as some sort of guru and thus treat his every word like doctrine?
By your... "logic"... an alcoholic, who derives pleasure from alcohol, has only one rational course of action, that of continuing to drink alcohol. You would say that any claim that he should stop drinking alcohol would be at fault, because an alcoholic should do that which makes him happy.
Except that's absolutely false. An alcoholic is not happy. His misery stems from his self-destructive actions. You're trying to say that it is not only logical, but in fact, the only logical choice, for an alcoholic to perpetuate his alcoholism.
I mean, I don't know from how far back you've decided to stand back to admire yourself, but it's telling that you cannot seem to see any holes in your argument, despite the fact that they are the size of canyons.
Because you talk as if moral claims are categorical and then bring up hypothetical imperative examples.
Again, neither term is relevant to what I was saying at all.
I was not begging the question... you merely expressed doubt, and I was asking about why you doubted...
Which contradicts what you said above.
No it does not.
Once you acknowledge the fact that people go can go against whatever they may be conditioned by society to believe is right or wrong, you have conceded that there are more factors to be considered than simply "evolution and society".
Humans are not robots. Evolution and social norms are the main, huge contributing factors, but they are not everything. Do you dispute that evolution has an impact on your values?
I don't see how it is nihilism, but that's irrelevant. Your argument has many of the same flaws that cultural relativism does.
It is defined as a type of moral nihilism. Hence why I said earlier that you seem to be misunderstanding the arguments. I did not mean that as a personal attack, and I am sorry if it came off that way.
Sadly, yes.
How should I respond here. I could or mention that this is not an argument. But surely you would have anticipated that response. Is it surprising that a moral nihilist position would be one that goes against some cherished beliefs?
Then there's something ☺☺☺☺ing wrong with the person's belief system, isn't there?
I don't share the value system as that hypothetical agent, but this claim is exactly the thing that I think is unjustified. *I* would find it against my values.
Not if they're irrational. That is the definition of the word, after all.
What? Ok I shall try to be clearer.
If an agent desires X then the rational move obtains X. The irrational move is the move that does not obtain X.
Let us note that an agent can desire X, Y, and Z, etc. Some of these can be contradictory. In that case the calculation gets more complicated. In practical terms I call this package of values and desires a utility function.
Now a stupid or irrational agent could be bad at fulfilling his utility function, this can lead to an undesired state of affairs. But there is no rule of logic that says that A, B, and C is the ONE thing to care about in your utility function, or that every utility function should have X in it.
Again, you're doing the same thing the moral relativists do, "It doesn't matter where you get your ethical beliefs, or if they even remotely make sense, it just matters what you believe."
I said you can be stupid and have normal values and smart and have strange values. This statement *seems* so trivially true as to be incontestable.
Except, that undermines the whole idea of logic and really any thought process at all, and makes us no longer philosophers and turns us into cavemen.
HOW does it undermine logic? The onus is on you to demonstrate that statement. Is this hyperbole or do you actually believe that? I was unaware that if I reject categorical imperatives I am now a caveman. Please show me where logic says that everyone must have X in their utility function?
Except that's not what the word "taboo" means at all. In fact it's pretty much the opposite of what taboo means.
Plus, there's a perfectly good word for what you're asking, which actually means what you're talking about. It's the word "define".
I used that phrasing earlier in the thread I believe. It is a reference to the game "Taboo" where you have to get the other players to understand a word without you saying that word. I already apologized for being unclear though, so yeah.
... Are you intentionally this ridiculous, or have you simply latched on to this person as some sort of guru and thus treat his every word like doctrine?
By your... "logic"...
Your attitude sure is not helpful here. All I ever said was hey: maybe you should provide some argument instead of just dismissing the idea as absurd.
an alcoholic, who derives pleasure from alcohol, has only one rational course of action, that of continuing to drink alcohol. You would say that any claim that he should stop drinking alcohol would be at fault, because an alcoholic should do that which makes him happy.
Humans are complex creatures with competing value sets. I would be *amazed* if there actually was a human that valued nothing but alcohol. In all likelihood, he just desires something else and uses alcohol as an attempted means to that end.
Except that's absolutely false. An alcoholic is not happy. His misery stems from his self-destructive actions. You're trying to say that it is not only logical, but in fact, the only logical choice, for an alcoholic to perpetuate his alcoholism.
Your example is like this:
Suppose an agent that values X, Y, and Z. He also has desires for object A. A seems to help promote Z but may not, it also goes strongly against values X, and Y. THE ONLY LOGICAL CHOICE IS A!!!!
No sorry, that is wrong. Hell you even admit in your example that he is miserable as a result of the alcohol.... which obviously does not work since as a human he values being happy. My earlier point hopefully addressed this.
I mean, I don't know from how far back you've decided to stand back to admire yourself, but it's telling that you cannot seem to see any holes in your argument, despite the fact that they are the size of canyons.
Oh yes, my view is one perpetuated by my extreme ego. Look, I am fine with people providing good arguments and objections - I want to know the truth, not what is comfortable or sounds nice. If I am wrong, that would be great, I would just move on to whatever the new most correct sounding theory is. But your insults and expressions of doubt are not persuasive in any way. You seem to show pure incredulity that anyone could actually be a moral nihilist. Just because you doubt that position it does not follow that A: your arguments are strong, or B: that others can be nihilists.
[quote]
Again, neither term is relevant to what I was saying at all.
The nature of moral claims seems to me like something relevant to a discussion on morality.
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EDH Decks -- Updated 9/28
----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
You committed a logical fallacy in which you assumed the proposition to be proven was already true. That's begging the question.
No it does not.
Of course it does. You have argued that humans derive morality from evolution and social norms. Except, you're now saying that there's more to a person's ethics than evolution and social norms, which is what I said.
Humans are not robots.
Correct. Except, here's the thing, that's exactly what I was saying when I was disagreeing with you.
Evolution and social norms are the main, huge contributing factors, but they are not everything.
I need you to understand that what you are saying right now is in opposition to what you were saying before.
It is defined as a type of moral nihilism.
Which I cannot agree with because you are not a nihilist. A nihilist doesn't say, "This is against my values but not against your values." A nihilist rejects values. That's moral relativism.
If an agent desires X then the rational move obtains X. The irrational move is the move that does not obtain X.
Right.
Now a stupid or irrational agent could be bad at fulfilling his utility function, this can lead to an undesired state of affairs.
Right.
But there is no rule of logic that says that A, B, and C is the ONE thing to care about in your utility function, or that every utility function should have X in it.
Prove it.
Humans are complex creatures with competing value sets. I would be *amazed* if there actually was a human that valued nothing but alcohol. In all likelihood, he just desires something else and uses alcohol as an attempted means to that end.
Precisely.
Your example is like this:
Suppose an agent that values X, Y, and Z. He also has desires for object A. A seems to help promote Z but may not, it also goes strongly against values X, and Y. THE ONLY LOGICAL CHOICE IS A!!!!
No sorry, that is wrong. Hell you even admit in your example that he is miserable as a result of the alcohol.... which obviously does not work since as a human he values being happy.
No, you misunderstand what's happening here.
I have perceived a flaw in your psychopath argument. I have thus taken this flaw and created an argument with the same faulty logic as the flaw I've perceived in your argument.
So when you tell me there's a flaw in my drunk guy argument, the answer is yes, of course there is. However, the whole point of the drunk guy argument is it is supposed to show you the flaw in your own. You are supposed to take what applies here, and understand it also applies there.
So when I say, "By your logic exhibited , [incorrect statement]," and you say that the statement is incorrect, that should cause you to reflect on the psychopath argument.
So let's take these two arguments that you've said:
Now a stupid or irrational agent could be bad at fulfilling his utility function, this can lead to an undesired state of affairs.
Humans are complex creatures with competing value sets. I would be *amazed* if there actually was a human that valued nothing but alcohol. In all likelihood, he just desires something else and uses alcohol as an attempted means to that end.
And with these in mind, go back to what you originally argued.
The other argument often attributed to Mackie, often called the Argument from Disagreement, maintains that any moral claim (e.g. "Killing babies is wrong") entails a correspondent "reasons claim" ("one has reason not to kill babies"). Put another way, if "killing babies is wrong" is true then everybody has a reason to not kill babies. This includes the psychopath who takes great pleasure from killing babies, and is utterly miserable when he does not have their blood on his hands. But, surely, (if we assume that he will suffer no reprisals) this psychopath has every reason to kill babies, and no reason not to do so. All moral claims are thus false.
How does your problem with my drunkard example not apply to the psychopath?
The paragraph errs when it says that the psychopath has every reason to kill babies, therefore his reason and the reason not to kill babies cancel out, ergo all moral statements cancel out.
That's bull☺☺☺☺. The paragraph's failure is to assume that all reasons are equal and that any reason will be sufficiently canceled out by an opposing reason. (This is moral relativism, by the way.) Except all reasons are not equal.
"Killing babies is wrong" is a statement derived from the fact that there are REASONS against killing a baby, and that these reasons outweigh any reason for killing a baby. Moreover, any reason FOR killing a baby does not work if the reasons make no logical sense, or if they are entirely personal.
The entire point of ethics is it is NOT entirely personal. There is a HUGE difference between an ethical statement and a personal preference. "Killing babies is wrong" is an ethical statement. It is NOT the same as "killing babies is wrong because I don't like to do it" or "killing babies is wrong because it makes me feel bad". If a person does not like to eat raisins because he does not like the taste, that does not retroactively make eating raisins immoral.
Thus, there are many reasons why it is wrong to kill a baby. Your argument is that those reasons are completely rendered null when a psychopath argues for killing babies. Except, the psychopath has no argument for killing babies, other than, "I like killing babies", which doesn't hold up. One may derive pleasure from doing something immoral, but that does not mean doing something immoral is right.
Furthermore, he's a psychopath. "A psychopath behaves this way, therefore the psychopath must be correct because the psychopath's reason for behaving in a certain manner must exceed the reasons for why his actions are immoral or else he wouldn't be performing the action" is a horrible argument, because "psychopath" is mentally insane and thus not capable of rational decision making by definition.
The point is the instance of a psychopath, or even a person who makes the conscious choice to behave immorally, does not reflect upon a moral claim. Blinking Spirit brought up the idea of Flat Earthers. This is a perfect example, because there's no debate here: "the Earth is round" is a statement we all agree is objectively true. Yet, here are people who reject the statement.
By your argument, the Flat Earthers rejecting the statement that the Earth is round either reflects upon or flat out nullifies the value of the statement that the Earth is round. But it doesn't. The reason WHY it doesn't is because we do not simply see one argument and a contradictory argument and dismiss it as a wash. We accept that these arguments may not be equal and scrutinize the reasons behind them, and we see that that the arguments for the Earth being round greatly exceed the arguments that the Earth is flat.
It is the same with your argument. You want to argue that any statement arguing an action to be immoral (for instance, "Killing babies is wrong") will always be met with a contradictory statement by the people who perform the immoral action (the people arguing that "killing babies is right"), and thus cancel out. Except that doesn't work, because ethical statements don't exist in a vacuum. Ethical statements exist because of arguments based on reasons, and the reasons for "killing babies is wrong" outweighs "killing babies is right".
If I were to mug someone, I would be doing something wrong, because mugging someone is wrong. I may not fully understand why mugging someone is wrong, or I may understand the reasons perfectly and have chosen not to mug someone, but none of that has any bearing on the statement "Mugging someone is wrong", because my reasons for mugging someone did not outweigh the reasons not to mug them.
You see, the paragraph says that if one says "Killing babies is wrong" then it logically follows that it "everyone has a reason not to kill babies", which is true, because the reason everyone has to not kill babies is "killing babies is wrong". When we say that "everyone has a reason not to kill babies", we're talking about a moral imperative not to kill babies.
The problem is the paragraph misses this. It takes "everyone has a reason not to kill babies" out of its context and interprets it literally. Again, when we say everyone has a reason not to kill babies, that's something that stems from the first statement, "Killing babies is wrong". Thus, "everyone has a reason not to kill babies because killing babies is wrong". It is a moral imperative.
It does not mean everyone necessarily knows about the reasons why they should not kill babies, or that everyone follows the reasons why they should not kill babies, or even that there aren't people who will try to argue that it is right to kill babies. It means that the reasons for killing babies exceed the reasons why we should not kill babies and thus it is imperative that we follow the statement, "killing babies is wrong".
You committed a logical fallacy in which you assumed the proposition to be proven was already true. That's begging the question.
Why did you not quote the entire sentence? You can only beg the question in an argument. I was asking about your doubt.
Of course it does. You have argued that humans derive morality from evolution and social norms. Except, you're now saying that there's more to a person's ethics than evolution and social norms, which is what I said.
Correct. Except, here's the thing, that's exactly what I was saying when I was disagreeing with you.
I never said that those were the only things! I disagree that you people magically get values from logic.
I need you to understand that what you are saying right now is in opposition to what you were saying before.
No... it is not. I am simply going into more depth now. I thought it was obvious that I was not claiming every value must come from those two causes, but that I meant those were the main factors. Since you did not see this, I decided to explain it.
Which I cannot agree with because you are not a nihilist. A nihilist doesn't say, "This is against my values but not against your values." A nihilist rejects values. That's moral relativism.
I was going to say : that a nihilist does not reject values, he rejects moral claims. It is merely the claim that nothing is inherently right or wrong. But I did some looking around, and some definitions of nihilism do say that nothing has value period. I take it to mean that there is no objective value. However, it seems that the definitions often meld and are messy.
So just to be clear: I believe that there is no objective value, but there is subjective value, aka personal value.
Prove it.
The burden of proof is on the person that wishes to claim that there is such a rule of logic. If you can show me there is, I would be impressed.
I have perceived a flaw in your psychopath argument. I have thus taken this flaw and created an argument with the same faulty logic as the flaw I've perceived in your argument.
So when you tell me there's a flaw in my drunk guy argument, the answer is yes, of course there is. However, the whole point of the drunk guy argument is it is supposed to show you the flaw in your own. You are supposed to take what applies here, and understand it also applies there.
So when I say, "By your logic exhibited , [incorrect statement]," and you say that the statement is incorrect, that should cause you to reflect on the psychopath argument.
In the psychopath argument the psychopath is not this complex moral agent with competing desires. He literally only values killing babies. The problem with your alcoholic example is then separate.
So let's take these two arguments that you've said:
And with these in mind, go back to what you originally argued.
How does your problem with my drunkard example not apply to the psychopath?
Right, so again I think you are missing the point of my objection. I am saying you did not actual show an agent that was fulfilling his utility function. The psychopath in the psychopath example is actually fulfilling his utility function.
The paragraph errs when it says that the psychopath has every reason to kill babies, therefore his reason and the reason not to kill babies cancel out, ergo all moral statements cancel out.
What is his reason to not kill babies? I am not making a rhetorical question here. I seriously want to know WHAT the exact reasons are. Any response to this that is not a reason for not killing babies is inadequate.
That's bull☺☺☺☺. The paragraph's failure is to assume that all reasons are equal and that any reason will be sufficiently canceled out by an opposing reason. (This is moral relativism, by the way.) Except all reasons are not equal.
Right, if you have competing reasons then they can be unequal. In this example, the psychopath is *lacking* the reasons that you or I would have.
"Killing babies is wrong" is a statement derived from the fact that there are REASONS against killing a baby, and that these reasons outweigh any reason for killing a baby.
Again spell out the reasons that apply to the psychopath.
The entire point of ethics is it is NOT entirely personal.
Right, I think that all attempts at this fail.
There is a HUGE difference between an ethical statement and a personal preference. "Killing babies is wrong" is an ethical statement. It is NOT the same as "killing babies is wrong because I don't like to do it" or "killing babies is wrong because it makes me feel bad".
I agree. If objective moral claims existed, this is what they would look like. X is wrong... period.
However, these types pf propositions are all false. (I think)I have yet to see a good explanation for how they would be true.
If a person does not like to eat raisins because he does not like the taste, that does not retroactively make eating raisins immoral.
So, basically.... I agree. An error theorist thinks nothing is immoral.
Thus, there are many reasons why it is wrong to kill a baby. Your argument is that those reasons are completely rendered null when a psychopath argues for killing babies.
No, it would be that he has 0 reasons. The reasons to not kill a baby do not apply to him.
Except, the psychopath has no argument for killing babies, other than, "I like killing babies", which doesn't hold up.
Reasons are not arguments. If I said: "I enjoy playing magic the gathering." Would you say I have a reason to play magic? Or would you say that I had no argument for playing magic?
One may derive pleasure from doing something immoral, but that does not mean doing something immoral is right.
I dispute that certain claims are objectively *right*. Basically, my mind can be changed if you show me how something can be objectively right. If you could show me a categorical imperative, then error theory is wrong.
Furthermore, he's a psychopath. "A psychopath behaves this way, therefore the psychopath must be correct because the psychopath's reason for behaving in a certain manner must exceed the reasons for why his actions are immoral or else he wouldn't be performing the action" is a horrible argument, because "psychopath" is mentally insane and thus not capable of rational decision making by definition.
Be wary of arguing by definition. In our example the psychopath has twisted values. But there is nothing to say that his mental faculties are not functioning otherwise. Also, I say nothing like: he must be correct. I don't think objective "correctness" exists.
The point is the instance of a psychopath, or even a person who makes the conscious choice to behave immorally, does not reflect upon a moral claim. Blinking Spirit brought up the idea of Flat Earthers. This is a perfect example, because there's no debate here: "the Earth is round" is a statement we all agree is objectively true. Yet, here are people who reject the statement.
The earth is round corresponds to an observable fact about reality. It is quite different then a normative claim. Remember when you said that earlier?
By your argument, the Flat Earthers rejecting the statement that the Earth is round either reflects upon or flat out nullifies the value of the statement that the Earth is round.
No, no, no, no! This is why I say things like you do not seem to understand what I am saying. Even if every human on the planet agreed that killing babies was wrong, it would not follow that it is objectively wrong. Error theory cares very much about the *nature* of moral claims. So all this talk about non-moral claims is a red herring.
In fact, this is so important that I want to stop here before continuing with the rest of the post.
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EDH Decks -- Updated 9/28
----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
SneakySly: You're still not understanding the differences between personal preferences and ethical statements. Until you do so, I cannot proceed further in this thread.
The problem is you're doing exactly the same thing Feathas did:
Quote from Highroller »
We need to backtrack a bit here. Just ditch the term "Objective morality" for now.
Three viewpoints:
1. There is an a single, universally correct moral code
2. There isn't a single, universally correct moral code
3. Ethical subjectivism
There is a distinction between idea 2 and idea 3.
In idea 2, saying that mass genocide is correct because the hippopotamus told me to do it does not follow, for two reasons: the hippo cannot talk, and even if he could, him telling you to commit mass genocide is by no means a valid reason for behaving in such a manner.
In idea 3, saying the above is perfectly valid, because ethical subjectivism argues that you are correct if you believe you are correct, or incorrect if you believe you are incorrect. That's all there is to it. It does not matter if your beliefs are either logical or rooted in fact at all.
I'm arguing against three. I need you to see the difference between three and two. You seem to think that arguing against three means arguing for one. This is not the same thing.
You don't seem to understand the difference between arguing against 3 and arguing for 1. Until you do, then you're going to continue to run around in a circle.
SneakySly: You're still not understanding the differences between personal preferences and ethical statements. Until you do so, I cannot proceed further in this thread.
When you claim such backwards things, it saddens me. I have extensively talked about that difference over and over again. This statement is false on it's face.
I even told you what you could due to show that I am wrong.
Your quote brings it together nicely. I never gave a rats ass about 3. I have been talking about 2 the whole time!
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----------------------- Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans Progenitus - 5 Color Control Mangara - MWC Drana - MBC Ashling - 50 Mountain Death Karn - Typical Karn deck Kresh - Sac + Tokens Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank Teeg -30 disenchants
--------------------------- Dismantled Sen Triplets - Boring Control Uril - Enchantment Voltron
When you claim such backwards things, it saddens me. I have extensively talked about that difference over and over again. This statement is false on it's face.
I even told you what you could due to show that I am wrong.
Your quote brings it together nicely. I never gave a rats ass about 3. I have been talking about 2 the whole time!
In fact, to wade in here, 2 is more important than 3. In fact, you can believe in 2 and 3 concurrently, since they are talking about two different things. While I personally think 3 is a load of bunk regardless, it can still be possible to hold both.
Just so I can make sure I understand the nature of the argument, everyone is trying to debate whether ethics exists metaphysically, or are we all trying to debate normative claims? Because I'm down for debating meta-ethics, not so much for normative ethics.
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Proximately? The language we speak. The moral code is "the moral code" in the same way that the Earth is "the Earth". Sure, you can always redefine words, declare that "morality" might mean paperclip maximization or that "the Earth" might mean a pancake. But at that point, you are no longer speaking the same language as your interlocutor - and at any rate, you have simply changed the thing you are talking about, not the properties of the thing your interlocutor is talking about. So you're not actually making any metaethical or metaphysical point; you're just playing with the fundamental arbitrariness of language.
Ultimately? We can ask why our language has identified this particular normative code with a special word, and why our culture and psychology give this code special significance. This is where we start talking about social evolution and fitness landscapes, which give us an objective and non-arbitrary* explanation for this behavior. Paperclip maximization - who cares? Certainly not natural selection. But morality actually does something.
*You may note that I both call language "arbitrary" and say there is a "non-arbitrary" explanation for how we use it. This may need a little unpacking. Using the particular word "morality" to refer to the thing morality is arbitrary; the language could use any word to refer to morality, and could use "morality" to refer to anything. But the historical explanation for why we have some word to refer to morality is not arbitrary in the least.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
On the contrary, it is in every way relative. That's the point. If all moral codes are relative, no moral code is in anyway superior or more right than any other. Thus, all moral statements are null. If I believe torturing puppies and helping the Grinch steal Christmas are correct, and you don't, both statements are... I can't even say they're both correct, as in a moral relativist mindset, the statement "___ ethical stance is correct/incorrect" is a meaningless term.
Yes, and look to the above for the logical conclusion of that.
Ethics does NOT say things are right or wrong because you think so. It's the study of how one should conduct oneself based on logic, reason, and facts with the aim of living a good life in order to gain happiness.
Moral relativism and ethics are thus incompatible. Moral relativism literally is only that, "you are right or wrong based on how you act in accordance to what you THINK is right or wrong". It does not go into reasons why one is right or reasons one is wrong, because it doesn't matter in moral relativism. If you think you are right, for whatever reason, you are right.
Do you see the problem now?
Fail. Relativism cannot be objective, that doesn't make any sense, those words contradict each other. It would be like boiling ice water, it's either boiling water or ice water.
This does not make sense.
No, that's cultural subjectivism. That takes ethical subjectivism (a person is right or wrong based on what he or she thinks is right or wrong) and applies that to a whole culture. It is PROFOUNDLY more problematic and filled with holes.
That makes no sense. The terms are opposites.
Because they DON'T.
Again, look at the logical conclusion that results when you follow your line of thought.
No it doesn't.
It merely states that there is such a thing as facts, and that it matters WHY you believe something is correct, and WHAT your rationale is.
Once again, this is ethical subjectivism: "You are right or wrong for doing an action based on what you THINK is right or wrong behavior." Do you see the problem?
There's a huge difference between "there is no objective morality" and moral relativism. I need people to see the distinction before we proceed further.
If Zombie Shakespeare doesn't exist, then any action done on the basis that it is a correct action because Zombie Shakespeare said to do it fails, doesn't it?
I don't think you know what "objectively immoral" means. A majority does not determine objective immorality. If a moral code is objective, that means the morality is objective, as in it is what it is regardless of whether or not all people believe otherwise.
Again, I'm not seeing a demonstration of understanding as to you knowing what "objectively immoral" means. If something is objectively immoral, then everyone in the world could believe that something to be a morally correct action and it wouldn't matter. That's the whole point.
Despite the fact that I do believe in a universal moral judge, the fact stands that even without one, ethics can still exist as a philosophy.
That is exactly the opposite of both what I have argued and what objective morality means.
Collective morality is far more problematic than ethical subjectivism. I don't have the time to fully detail why right now. I feel I will have to later though.
I completely agree with the bolded part.
However when we apply this to the moral code, and we unpack it, we run into problems. This is why I earlier asked about what you meant by moral.
Ask a utilitarian what he means by moral and then ask someone who believes in divine command theory.
Yup, social evolution and fitness landscapes provide objective explanations of the behavior.
But paperclip maximization does something too! Just nothing that we care about. Hence the importance of values.
Imagine a bunch of paperclip maximizers get together, and say that line in reverse, "Increasing happiness - who cares? Paperclip maximization actually does something."
I can agree with that. Yes there is an objective explanation for how it came to be that we call certain types of things morality. That is a claim I do not dispute.
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Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
I'd point out that the differences between utilitarianism and DCT are mostly explanatory: they disagree about the nature of moral propositions, but by and large they agree on what the moral propositions are (don't lie, don't kill, etc.). We are still at a rather primitive state of understanding of the thing we call "morality", but even though we have many different theories, this doesn't mean we can't all be talking about the same thing nevertheless. Competing explanations for the same phenomenon are certainly nothing new in philosophy or science. But one of those explanations is true (albeit perhaps one that nobody has thought of yet), and the rest of them are false.
And yes, utilitarianism and DCT do disagree in some uncommon scenarios about what the moral propositions are. These disagreements stem of course from their underlying theories, not from a radical disagreement about what morality is. It's basic empiricism: observe an instance of a phenomenon, theorize about the phenomenon, apply the theory to a different instance of what might be the same phenomenon. All these moral theories are positing explanations for the morality they find in clear cases (again: don't lie, don't kill, etc.), and then using these explanations to try and decide what's moral in the unclear cases. They're still all on the same subject, and an explanation that's closer to the truth can help sort the matter out. A theory of paperclip maximization, in contrast, is on the subject of a different phenomenon entirely.
So what? There are no paperclip maximizers, and we have an explanation for why there are no paperclip maximizers.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Right, but if the *nature* is wrong then it all falls apart. If a DCT later goes on to realize that God does not exist, then the entire reason for the moral claim X goes away under their view. It does not matter if some totally different theory still says X. It was the reason for X, not X itself was what mattered.
Another option is that none of them are true. Additionally, morality could be a variety of hypothetical imperatives (This seems correct).
It could be that this is just a result of our moral faculties having evolved, so humans share similar values. This really does not tell us that there is some kind of ultimate right or wrong.
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Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Bass-ackwards. Phenomena first, explanations second. If we find out that an explanation is wrong, the phenomenon doesn't go away. It's ridiculous to think that biologists, when confronted with evidence that there is no vital spirit to separate living from unliving matter, would have thrown up their hands and said, "I guess nothing is alive!"
It's one specific set of hypothetical imperatives, that's a little fuzzy due to human uncertainty, but is nevertheless identifiable clearly enough that we can have conversations about what exactly it is and where it came from. If everyone were just bringing their own random imperatives to the table, we would not see the huge overlap that we do.
What would you consider "ultimate right or wrong"? It strikes me that you may have an impossible standard. The cold, hard logic of life as an intelligent social animal has asserted itself through group selection to produce the moral norms we observe. Call it "ultimate" or don't, but it is objective morality.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Could not humans arrive to similar moral judgments because... we're all human? In the same way that all sharks have gills because it helped them to breathe underwater, and they had that trait before they differentiated? Isn't it possible that the roots of this morality were established before humans began to spread around the world, thus creating the bottleneck effect on it?
I'd also like to point out that our morality is not and was especially not very uniform before globalization... western morality has commonly shunned suicide greatly, whereas it was embraced in several forms in Japan. We still have plenty of debates on this forum about how the middle-east is "barbaric" and such.
Forgive me if I'm wrong, but are you saying that the fact (if it is indeed a fact) that our morality came about by evolution proves that it's the best form of it? Evolution does not bring to the surface the best traits, simply ones that are sufficient.
Is it "best" that we don't have several adaptations that other species do? What about back when all species had no CNS? Surely you wouldn't have said that no CNS is optimal if you knew that you could have a CNS...
@Highroller: I'm not misunderstanding the term "objective". I'm not understanding how you can say something is objective and assume that we know what it is. By what means have you deduced (not induced) this objective morality? The only source I can see from what you and many others say, is the majority. If it's from the majority, then how do you know that your colleagues were correct? How can you know that any source of morality is "correct"? How do you know that the German nazis weren't correct?
I agree that phenomena -> explanations is the proper way to go about things. However, this is not how all people operate. I think the DCT example was quite fitting, because many fervent religious people adamantly deny that you can have morality without God. If God disappeared then for them moral claims would go away. Why? Because the *reason* would be gone.
If you agree with me on the hypothetical imperative nature of morality then I would go so far as to say we are almost entirely in agreement on this. I think our dispute is now purely on what we mean by "objective".
Yes moral claims typically refer to a certain class of hypothetical imperatives.
Kant had a system of morality that did not use hypothetical imperatives. That was one of his big goals for a moral theory, as he did not think hypothetical imperatives were enough.
Additionally apologists like William Lane Craig think that God provides an objective metric or right and wrong, in a way different from a hypothetical imperative.
Generally theories of morality like those are called objective. The kind of morality that you seem to be talking about is real, but not objective in the above sense.
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Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Sure. And to a certain extent, I think that's what actually happened; certainly hominids were social animals long before Homo sapiens. But I believe what you're getting at is that these "bottlenecks" can lead to the spread of arbitrary and non-adaptive traits - like how East Asians have epicanthic folds, despite there being no known survival advantage to them. So the question is, is moral behavior adaptive or non-adaptive? And I think the evidence is resoundingly in favor of it being adaptive.
But you're right, the best test of this theory would be to find another intelligent social animal that evolved independently of us and see if they converged on the same solution to the problem.
Of course different societies are different in detail; if there weren't variation, there wouldn't be evolution. But only scratch the surface of these "barbaric" moral codes, and you'll see that they all run on the same operating system, as it were. Ritual suicide may not show up in all cultures, but the concepts of disgrace and atonement are certainly familiar to us, as is the reason for disgrace: duty, and the failure to fulfill it. The more I read about different cultures, the more struck I am by how fundamentally similar we all are, in spite of wildly different circumstances.
And this is precisely why I can comfortably reject Medieval Japanese cultural practices, or even modern Western ones, as the true morality. The fundamentals of human moral behavior are solid, I think, and Western liberalism is the closest we've yet come to the lofty apex of the fitness peak. But I certainly don't deny that there's room for improvement - perhaps a lot of room. What evolution does is point us in the right direction, give us a project we can identify objectively. It's not the be-all and end-all of the matter.
Well, humans are human, and sometimes they get way too attached to a theory. There are scientists who will swear up and down that their explanation for the phenomena is the only possible one, that if it were any other way the phenomena simply could not be. To a certain extent, this isn't a bad thing - after all, the scientific method does uncover the truth by eliminating impossible explanations. But we can still be wrong. The perceived reason can disappear and leave the actual reason intact.
I'm not familiar with the work of Craig in particular, but if he's like most divine command theorists he shares one major feature with Kant: when confronted with the is-ought gap they don't try to bridge it, but rather establish a foundational truth on the "ought" side and build from there. And this seems to be what you're getting at in your quest for the "ultimate". But it strikes me as very strange to exclude moral naturalists like myself, who do try to ground morality on the "is" side of the gap, from the objectivist club.
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Very true.
That pretty much is exactly what Craig does. And this sense of objective is something theists (Craig in particular) use when they bring up the moral argument from God's existence.
Now I have a whole slew of problems with the moral argument and the DCT of ethics. But nonetheless, Craig would readily assert that Naturalists are excluded from the objectivist club, and I have not seen a naturalistic ethics that is capable of getting to the ought side in that manner.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
All "is" statements are actually "ought" statements.
"The tissue box is to have tissues in it."
Well, actually, this particular tissue box is empty. Tissues are not in it.
"The tissue box ought to have tissues in it."
That's better.
Same with any "is" statement. They're all "oughts," semantically.
Objectively, there is no knowable "is" statement.
I'm sorry, in what manner?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
No you didn't. You seem to be conflating moral objectivity with "what the majority believes". That's exactly the opposite of that.
Except, you're arguing exactly the opposite of what I'm arguing. So no, you're not pointing out a flaw in my judgment, because my judgment is precisely the opposite of what you're saying.
We need to backtrack a bit here. Just ditch the term "Objective morality" for now.
Three viewpoints:
1. There is an a single, universally correct moral code
2. There isn't a single, universally correct moral code
3. Ethical subjectivism
There is a distinction between idea 2 and idea 3.
In idea 2, saying that mass genocide is correct because the hippopotamus told me to do it does not follow, for two reasons: the hippo cannot talk, and even if he could, him telling you to commit mass genocide is by no means a valid reason for behaving in such a manner.
In idea 3, saying the above is perfectly valid, because ethical subjectivism argues that you are correct if you believe you are correct, or incorrect if you believe you are incorrect. That's all there is to it. It does not matter if your beliefs are either logical or rooted in fact at all.
I'm arguing against three. I need you to see the difference between three and two. You seem to think that arguing against three means arguing for one. This is not the same thing.
Except, consensus doesn't matter.
Again, it doesn't matter if people everyone agrees that exterminating the Jewish people is a correct and proper action, it still isn't.
And, which I don't think you realize, this follows under both idea 1 and idea 2, not just idea one.
No, this is the problem. Your argument seems to be:
A. Objective morality is a moral system based on what the majority believe
B. The majority could believe something totally different, and thus the system would change
C. Ergo, objective morality is not objective
Except statement A is incorrect. That's precisely the OPPOSITE of what moral objectivity is, and also what I'm arguing.
What are you talking about, we do that all the time.
I don't understand what on earth you're saying here. People hold contradictory opinions in their heads all the time. People are ambivalent on things all the time. People are conflicted about things all the time.
Again, what you're calling "objective morality" isn't.
I think by "objective morality" you mean societal norm? I mean, that's an extremely problematic idea in itself, but before we go into that I first want you to establish that this has nothing to do with what objective morality is.
It's not.
Then we'll call it collective morality, but that's because that's not at all what objective morality means.
Good.
Yeah but here's the thing. Your values aren't your values for no reason. No one rolled a D6 to determine whether or not you think abortion should be legal or illegal. Your values are your values because of an argument you have towards it.
You have values because you believe things are right or wrong, should be legal or illegal BECAUSE of certain arguments. You can make rational cases for or against certain moral statements.
So saying, "I would find his actions wrong because his actions would be going against my values" is correct, but understand, your values are not arbitrary. Your values are your values because you make a logical case for them.
What do you mean?
Ok.
Well that's obviously bull☺☺☺☺ on many, many levels.
The statement seeks to argue that:
1. Any moral claim (people should not murder babies) is based upon reasoning for why someone OUGHT to act a certain way
2. There are people who do not act according to that moral claim (people who murder babies)
3. These people (murders of babies) must have completely sound moral arguments for why they act the way they do.
4. Therefore, any moral claim (murdering babies is wrong) will fail.
I mean Sneaky, you've got to be able to see the reason why this is crap for yourself without my having to explain it. Obviously the problem is in claim 3. Just because someone does act a certain way doesn't mean they ought to be.
I'm not sure whether this constitutes an "Is Implies Ought" fallacy or just gullibility, as in: "This man is taking my money, but I'm sure he has a great reason for robbing me blind."
I'm not sure what you're getting at here.
The entire point of ethics is to maximize happiness by living what is a good life. That's the point of living a good life: to be happy.
Just because someone doesn't behave in a certain does not mean that he would not have any reason to do so.
I don't see the problem. The fact that people do X does not cause the above statement to falter.
Unless you believe that every human being behaves like an omniscient supercomputer, in which case, good luck with that.
Blinking Spirit is right. I'm not sure why you see the two situations as different.
Here's a scenario: we have the world's most irrefutable logical argument for the statement: "People should never harm unicorns", and someone harms a unicorn.
You seem to think that the fact that someone harms a unicorn reflects in anyway upon the validity of the first statement, "People should not harm unicorns". Except, it doesn't at all.
Recognize that "people should not harm unicorns" is not the same kind of statement as "the train should be coming soon".
The latter is another way of saying, "I expect the train will arrive soon". If the train doesn't arrive soon, then obviously I was incorrect.
But the former is saying, "People should not harm unicorns if they wish to behave in a manner that is morally sound". The fact that there are people who engage in immoral ALL THE TIME does not in any way damage this statement.
You seem unwilling to acknowledge that people can behave either illogically, irrationally, or stupidly. It will benefit you greatly to acknowledge this.
This entire dialogue seems to be your insistence that anyone who acts in any way MUST have unassailable reasons why he does so, that if a human being performs an action that action MUST be correct because a human being is performing it, and all human beings act in completely logical and rational and correct ways always at all times.
Or:
A. Every human being is incapable of immoral action
B. Human beings perform actions that contradict one another
C. All moral statements fail
Do you understand how none of that makes sense?
It's not just wrong, it's naive to the point where I have to believe you are smart enough not to believe this by virtue of you still being alive, and therefore must conclude you're not actually following your argument through to its obvious conclusions.
The happiness derived from behaving in a morally sound and justifiable manner.
Or, "A job well done is its own reward".
I just want to point something out here.
Your two big examples so far have been:
1. The behavior of a psychopath.
2. The behavior of a hypothetical creature who cannot do anything other than desire the expansion of paper clips.
Both these examples are people who are unable to think in a logical and sane manner or are capable of rational decision-making.
Do you see how this doesn't help you?
That's not an argument against objective morality. The second and third sentences in fact have nothing to do with the first.
I find Blinking Spirit's wording to be problematic here, which is why I want to amend it to this: even if something is stated to have universal value or worth, there's nothing that says that people will recognize this.
Again, I feel the wording is problematic, but I get what you're talking about. I would reword it as:
You: If moral propositions don't persuade people to believe them, then they aren't objective.
Me: I reject that premise. Here's an example of another statement that is objectively true and what people believe has no effect on how true it is.
This is pretty much just wrong. My values are a result of evolution and my own social upbringing. No one argued me into thinking pain is bad and happiness is good. Any argument influencing my behavior will generally already assume I value some things. We already went over this.
Example: An argument to invest money assumes that I value money.
Rationality does not give you values. Rationality can tell you how to best actualize your values.
My values have no logical basis. I like pleasure, and happiness, and I value other creatures experiencing these same feelings. This is not a result of logic. I did not sit down one day and go: hmm I wonder what I should value.
I would be wary of dismissing a well known philosophers argument as obvious bull☺☺☺☺. They are held to slightly higher standards then forum posts.
This is a good description of what he argues here.
I claim no such thing, neither does Mackie.
You are not understanding the error theory argument. Check out the link.
This is a really confused statement. You can define ethics that way if you wish, but that is begging the question. Taboo good life. now what do you mean? If a good life is just being happy, then isn't that something entirely different?
If you told a Buddhist ascetic that he has good reasons to invest in the stock market, he would rightfully dispute that.
This has nothing to do with what I think.
You could have a categorical imperative or a hypothetical imperative. You seem to be using language that would be categorical.
Yeah it is normative. I dispute that it is anything above a hypothetical imperative.
At the risk of repeating myself: you have gravely misunderstood the nature of the discussion. By now, hopefully you will see what I have actually been talking about.
@ BLINKING SPIRIT
Moral statements that are universally binding is I believe what Craig wants.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
I fail to see how that's possibly the case.
Those aren't the same thing as ethics.
Sounds like a personal problem.
"I like" is completely different from a moral statement. "I like chocolate ice cream" is not an ethic. "Someone should do ___" is an ethic.
Why?
Answer the above question, we'll go from there.
Is there a particular reason I should care who he is?
Ok.
Except simply dismissing them as being things of different cultures doesn't work. By that logic, everyone would just work in lock-step with the ethical stances by which they were raised. Except, no, people go against those stances ALL THE TIME. And they go against them FOR REASONS.
If we had a discussion right now, someone in favor of polygamy, someone not, they would have to justify their arguments with reasons. This kind of ethical discussion isn't possible under cultural relativism.
Except no, the imperative should not be withdrawn.
I mean, are you actually trying to argue: "Don't put your hands on the hot stove if you don't want to get burned" should be withdrawn if that person actually wants to get burned? No, it shouldn't be withdrawn, because that person is desiring something that is harmful and incredibly counterproductive to their well-being.
This is what I mean when I say you don't seem to understand the idea that people can be irrational, illogical, or stupid.
I fail to see how the institution is relevant.
You're not selling this well.
That is the point of ethics. Why else do you think we've been arguing as a species for this long about how to live our lives?
This isn't a properly constructed sentence.
No, it is by living a good life that we become happy.
What is with you and the stock market? That's Blinking Spirit's analogy, not mine.
How is this relevant?
What is it for an imperative to be "binding"?
candidus inperti; si nil, his utere mecum.
Ah... I see. I was right earlier; we were misunderstanding each other. I am a proponent of 2, and I thought you were arguing not against 3, but for 1; which I personally think doesn't make sense.
I took the topic to be "meta-ethical relativism" and you took it to be #3.
How so? That is how people get their values.
I am still talking about values. I think anyway, it is hard to tell when my line it taken out of it's context.
I agree here, why did you think I did not?
I already said how I got my values. The same way most humans do.
.....
I am merely suggesting that rejecting out of hand may not be appropriate.
Social norms are not rigid laws, but they do have strong predictive power on what people believe. Often, ethical disputes arise from differing values.
This particular argument is one of plausibility, anyway.
If you think that moral error theory is cultural relativism then you do not understand error theory. Error theory is a type of moral nihilism not relativism.
Yes that is exactly what I am arguing! If a person really-truly desired to experience pain, like if he was a masochist, then by all means he should try and experience pain. If that is what makes him happy, then go for it.
If an agent desires to feel pain then the rational move for them is to do actions that will result in them being in pain.
Intelligence has nothing to do with your values. You can be intelligent and have strange values, or dumb as a rock and have typical values. Stupidity would come into play with actualizing your values.
I am sorry I am not selling this well....
Because people think some kind of objective morality exists.
I thought it was clear, apologies. When I say taboo X, I mean define X. What do you actually mean when you say X.
So now I ask, taboo "good life". You are making a claim that X makes us happy. That is an empirical claim. Now it could be that X is the path to happiness for most humans. This would not say much for people that X does not make happy. And it certainly would not be a path to objective morality.
It is a good example of a normative statement, and why normative statements depend on conditionals. What is wrong with the stock market?
Because you talk as if moral claims are categorical and then bring up hypothetical imperative examples.
@BS
If you do not think that morality is binding, and that all moral statements are hypothetical imperatives then I have no dispute with that.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
Begging the question.
Which contradicts what you said above.
Once you acknowledge the fact that people go can go against whatever they may be conditioned by society to believe is right or wrong, you have conceded that there are more factors to be considered than simply "evolution and society".
I don't see how it is nihilism, but that's irrelevant. Your argument has many of the same flaws that cultural relativism does.
Sadly, yes.
Then there's something ☺☺☺☺ing wrong with the person's belief system, isn't there?
Not if they're irrational. That is the definition of the word, after all.
Again, you're doing the same thing the moral relativists do, "It doesn't matter where you get your ethical beliefs, or if they even remotely make sense, it just matters what you believe."
Except, that undermines the whole idea of logic and really any thought process at all, and makes us no longer philosophers and turns us into cavemen.
Except that's not what the word "taboo" means at all. In fact it's pretty much the opposite of what taboo means.
Plus, there's a perfectly good word for what you're asking, which actually means what you're talking about. It's the word "define".
... Are you intentionally this ridiculous, or have you simply latched on to this person as some sort of guru and thus treat his every word like doctrine?
By your... "logic"... an alcoholic, who derives pleasure from alcohol, has only one rational course of action, that of continuing to drink alcohol. You would say that any claim that he should stop drinking alcohol would be at fault, because an alcoholic should do that which makes him happy.
Except that's absolutely false. An alcoholic is not happy. His misery stems from his self-destructive actions. You're trying to say that it is not only logical, but in fact, the only logical choice, for an alcoholic to perpetuate his alcoholism.
I mean, I don't know from how far back you've decided to stand back to admire yourself, but it's telling that you cannot seem to see any holes in your argument, despite the fact that they are the size of canyons.
Again, neither term is relevant to what I was saying at all.
I was not begging the question... you merely expressed doubt, and I was asking about why you doubted...
No it does not.
Humans are not robots. Evolution and social norms are the main, huge contributing factors, but they are not everything. Do you dispute that evolution has an impact on your values?
It is defined as a type of moral nihilism. Hence why I said earlier that you seem to be misunderstanding the arguments. I did not mean that as a personal attack, and I am sorry if it came off that way.
How should I respond here. I could or mention that this is not an argument. But surely you would have anticipated that response. Is it surprising that a moral nihilist position would be one that goes against some cherished beliefs?
I don't share the value system as that hypothetical agent, but this claim is exactly the thing that I think is unjustified. *I* would find it against my values.
What? Ok I shall try to be clearer.
If an agent desires X then the rational move obtains X. The irrational move is the move that does not obtain X.
Let us note that an agent can desire X, Y, and Z, etc. Some of these can be contradictory. In that case the calculation gets more complicated. In practical terms I call this package of values and desires a utility function.
Now a stupid or irrational agent could be bad at fulfilling his utility function, this can lead to an undesired state of affairs. But there is no rule of logic that says that A, B, and C is the ONE thing to care about in your utility function, or that every utility function should have X in it.
I said you can be stupid and have normal values and smart and have strange values. This statement *seems* so trivially true as to be incontestable.
HOW does it undermine logic? The onus is on you to demonstrate that statement. Is this hyperbole or do you actually believe that? I was unaware that if I reject categorical imperatives I am now a caveman. Please show me where logic says that everyone must have X in their utility function?
I used that phrasing earlier in the thread I believe. It is a reference to the game "Taboo" where you have to get the other players to understand a word without you saying that word. I already apologized for being unclear though, so yeah.
Your attitude sure is not helpful here. All I ever said was hey: maybe you should provide some argument instead of just dismissing the idea as absurd.
Humans are complex creatures with competing value sets. I would be *amazed* if there actually was a human that valued nothing but alcohol. In all likelihood, he just desires something else and uses alcohol as an attempted means to that end.
Your example is like this:
Suppose an agent that values X, Y, and Z. He also has desires for object A. A seems to help promote Z but may not, it also goes strongly against values X, and Y. THE ONLY LOGICAL CHOICE IS A!!!!
No sorry, that is wrong. Hell you even admit in your example that he is miserable as a result of the alcohol.... which obviously does not work since as a human he values being happy. My earlier point hopefully addressed this.
Oh yes, my view is one perpetuated by my extreme ego. Look, I am fine with people providing good arguments and objections - I want to know the truth, not what is comfortable or sounds nice. If I am wrong, that would be great, I would just move on to whatever the new most correct sounding theory is. But your insults and expressions of doubt are not persuasive in any way. You seem to show pure incredulity that anyone could actually be a moral nihilist. Just because you doubt that position it does not follow that A: your arguments are strong, or B: that others can be nihilists.
The nature of moral claims seems to me like something relevant to a discussion on morality.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
You committed a logical fallacy in which you assumed the proposition to be proven was already true. That's begging the question.
Of course it does. You have argued that humans derive morality from evolution and social norms. Except, you're now saying that there's more to a person's ethics than evolution and social norms, which is what I said.
Correct. Except, here's the thing, that's exactly what I was saying when I was disagreeing with you.
I need you to understand that what you are saying right now is in opposition to what you were saying before.
Which I cannot agree with because you are not a nihilist. A nihilist doesn't say, "This is against my values but not against your values." A nihilist rejects values. That's moral relativism.
Right.
Right.
Prove it.
Precisely.
No, you misunderstand what's happening here.
I have perceived a flaw in your psychopath argument. I have thus taken this flaw and created an argument with the same faulty logic as the flaw I've perceived in your argument.
So when you tell me there's a flaw in my drunk guy argument, the answer is yes, of course there is. However, the whole point of the drunk guy argument is it is supposed to show you the flaw in your own. You are supposed to take what applies here, and understand it also applies there.
So when I say, "By your logic exhibited , [incorrect statement]," and you say that the statement is incorrect, that should cause you to reflect on the psychopath argument.
So let's take these two arguments that you've said:
And with these in mind, go back to what you originally argued.
How does your problem with my drunkard example not apply to the psychopath?
The paragraph errs when it says that the psychopath has every reason to kill babies, therefore his reason and the reason not to kill babies cancel out, ergo all moral statements cancel out.
That's bull☺☺☺☺. The paragraph's failure is to assume that all reasons are equal and that any reason will be sufficiently canceled out by an opposing reason. (This is moral relativism, by the way.) Except all reasons are not equal.
"Killing babies is wrong" is a statement derived from the fact that there are REASONS against killing a baby, and that these reasons outweigh any reason for killing a baby. Moreover, any reason FOR killing a baby does not work if the reasons make no logical sense, or if they are entirely personal.
The entire point of ethics is it is NOT entirely personal. There is a HUGE difference between an ethical statement and a personal preference. "Killing babies is wrong" is an ethical statement. It is NOT the same as "killing babies is wrong because I don't like to do it" or "killing babies is wrong because it makes me feel bad". If a person does not like to eat raisins because he does not like the taste, that does not retroactively make eating raisins immoral.
Thus, there are many reasons why it is wrong to kill a baby. Your argument is that those reasons are completely rendered null when a psychopath argues for killing babies. Except, the psychopath has no argument for killing babies, other than, "I like killing babies", which doesn't hold up. One may derive pleasure from doing something immoral, but that does not mean doing something immoral is right.
Furthermore, he's a psychopath. "A psychopath behaves this way, therefore the psychopath must be correct because the psychopath's reason for behaving in a certain manner must exceed the reasons for why his actions are immoral or else he wouldn't be performing the action" is a horrible argument, because "psychopath" is mentally insane and thus not capable of rational decision making by definition.
The point is the instance of a psychopath, or even a person who makes the conscious choice to behave immorally, does not reflect upon a moral claim. Blinking Spirit brought up the idea of Flat Earthers. This is a perfect example, because there's no debate here: "the Earth is round" is a statement we all agree is objectively true. Yet, here are people who reject the statement.
By your argument, the Flat Earthers rejecting the statement that the Earth is round either reflects upon or flat out nullifies the value of the statement that the Earth is round. But it doesn't. The reason WHY it doesn't is because we do not simply see one argument and a contradictory argument and dismiss it as a wash. We accept that these arguments may not be equal and scrutinize the reasons behind them, and we see that that the arguments for the Earth being round greatly exceed the arguments that the Earth is flat.
It is the same with your argument. You want to argue that any statement arguing an action to be immoral (for instance, "Killing babies is wrong") will always be met with a contradictory statement by the people who perform the immoral action (the people arguing that "killing babies is right"), and thus cancel out. Except that doesn't work, because ethical statements don't exist in a vacuum. Ethical statements exist because of arguments based on reasons, and the reasons for "killing babies is wrong" outweighs "killing babies is right".
If I were to mug someone, I would be doing something wrong, because mugging someone is wrong. I may not fully understand why mugging someone is wrong, or I may understand the reasons perfectly and have chosen not to mug someone, but none of that has any bearing on the statement "Mugging someone is wrong", because my reasons for mugging someone did not outweigh the reasons not to mug them.
You see, the paragraph says that if one says "Killing babies is wrong" then it logically follows that it "everyone has a reason not to kill babies", which is true, because the reason everyone has to not kill babies is "killing babies is wrong". When we say that "everyone has a reason not to kill babies", we're talking about a moral imperative not to kill babies.
The problem is the paragraph misses this. It takes "everyone has a reason not to kill babies" out of its context and interprets it literally. Again, when we say everyone has a reason not to kill babies, that's something that stems from the first statement, "Killing babies is wrong". Thus, "everyone has a reason not to kill babies because killing babies is wrong". It is a moral imperative.
It does not mean everyone necessarily knows about the reasons why they should not kill babies, or that everyone follows the reasons why they should not kill babies, or even that there aren't people who will try to argue that it is right to kill babies. It means that the reasons for killing babies exceed the reasons why we should not kill babies and thus it is imperative that we follow the statement, "killing babies is wrong".
Why did you not quote the entire sentence? You can only beg the question in an argument. I was asking about your doubt.
I never said that those were the only things! I disagree that you people magically get values from logic.
No... it is not. I am simply going into more depth now. I thought it was obvious that I was not claiming every value must come from those two causes, but that I meant those were the main factors. Since you did not see this, I decided to explain it.
I was going to say : that a nihilist does not reject values, he rejects moral claims. It is merely the claim that nothing is inherently right or wrong. But I did some looking around, and some definitions of nihilism do say that nothing has value period. I take it to mean that there is no objective value. However, it seems that the definitions often meld and are messy.
So just to be clear: I believe that there is no objective value, but there is subjective value, aka personal value.
The burden of proof is on the person that wishes to claim that there is such a rule of logic. If you can show me there is, I would be impressed.
In the psychopath argument the psychopath is not this complex moral agent with competing desires. He literally only values killing babies. The problem with your alcoholic example is then separate.
Right, so again I think you are missing the point of my objection. I am saying you did not actual show an agent that was fulfilling his utility function. The psychopath in the psychopath example is actually fulfilling his utility function.
What is his reason to not kill babies? I am not making a rhetorical question here. I seriously want to know WHAT the exact reasons are. Any response to this that is not a reason for not killing babies is inadequate.
Right, if you have competing reasons then they can be unequal. In this example, the psychopath is *lacking* the reasons that you or I would have.
Again spell out the reasons that apply to the psychopath.
Right, I think that all attempts at this fail.
I agree. If objective moral claims existed, this is what they would look like. X is wrong... period.
However, these types pf propositions are all false. (I think)I have yet to see a good explanation for how they would be true.
So, basically.... I agree. An error theorist thinks nothing is immoral.
No, it would be that he has 0 reasons. The reasons to not kill a baby do not apply to him.
Reasons are not arguments. If I said: "I enjoy playing magic the gathering." Would you say I have a reason to play magic? Or would you say that I had no argument for playing magic?
I dispute that certain claims are objectively *right*. Basically, my mind can be changed if you show me how something can be objectively right. If you could show me a categorical imperative, then error theory is wrong.
Be wary of arguing by definition. In our example the psychopath has twisted values. But there is nothing to say that his mental faculties are not functioning otherwise. Also, I say nothing like: he must be correct. I don't think objective "correctness" exists.
The earth is round corresponds to an observable fact about reality. It is quite different then a normative claim. Remember when you said that earlier?
No, no, no, no! This is why I say things like you do not seem to understand what I am saying. Even if every human on the planet agreed that killing babies was wrong, it would not follow that it is objectively wrong. Error theory cares very much about the *nature* of moral claims. So all this talk about non-moral claims is a red herring.
In fact, this is so important that I want to stop here before continuing with the rest of the post.
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
The problem is you're doing exactly the same thing Feathas did:
You don't seem to understand the difference between arguing against 3 and arguing for 1. Until you do, then you're going to continue to run around in a circle.
When you claim such backwards things, it saddens me. I have extensively talked about that difference over and over again. This statement is false on it's face.
I even told you what you could due to show that I am wrong.
Your quote brings it together nicely. I never gave a rats ass about 3. I have been talking about 2 the whole time!
-----------------------
Child of Alara - 60 Land Shenanigans
Progenitus - 5 Color Control
Mangara - MWC
Drana - MBC
Ashling - 50 Mountain Death
Karn - Typical Karn deck
Kresh - Sac + Tokens
Kamhal Fist of Krosa - Ramp + Eldrazi
Sakashima - Morph and Wizard themes
Flying Hippo - Spirit / arcane jank
Teeg -30 disenchants
---------------------------
Dismantled
Sen Triplets - Boring Control
Uril - Enchantment Voltron
In fact, to wade in here, 2 is more important than 3. In fact, you can believe in 2 and 3 concurrently, since they are talking about two different things. While I personally think 3 is a load of bunk regardless, it can still be possible to hold both.
Just so I can make sure I understand the nature of the argument, everyone is trying to debate whether ethics exists metaphysically, or are we all trying to debate normative claims? Because I'm down for debating meta-ethics, not so much for normative ethics.